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Abstract 
This dynamical interpretation of the continuum is based on a threefold 
perspective. First, detailed differentiation of all standard realms of Leibnizian 
Weltanschauung – (R real), (P phenomenal), (I ideal). Second, analysis of the 
scope of the Law of Continuity famously formulated by Leibniz and mapping it 
onto this (RPI) structure. Third, finding the precise place of dynamics and force in 
this (RPI) continuum. 
These perspectives (taxonomical, legislative and junctional) if put together lead to 
a new understanding of monads’ role; and they are not taken anymore as a 
discreet part of Leibnizian philosophy (as opposed to the ideal space and time), 
but as dynamical continuum incorporating in itself both contiguity and continuity. 
And in such a way they are both neutralizing and preserving the syncategorematic 
phenomenal infinity. The main point is that force can be applied both to 
perception and appetition of monads and by this we give the shortest Leibnizian 
answer to the Zeno’s Dichotomy paradox – “force”. But what is more important, 
such dynamical interpretation gives good schematic and systematic view of 
Leibnizian mature philosophy. And it appears (as expected) that the thread out of 
the Labyrinth of the Continuum is not only geometrical and physical, but 
metaphysical too. 
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Leibniz’deki Continuum’un Dinamik Bir Yorumu 
    
 Özet 
Continuum’un dinamik olan bu yorumu üçlü bir perspektife dayanmaktadır. İlkin 
Leibnizci Weltanschauung’un bütün standart gerçekliklerinin – (R gerçek), (P 
fenomenal), (I ideal)- detaylı olarak ayrımlaştırılması. İkinci olarak, Leibniz 
tarafından çok iyi bir biçimde formüle edilmiş olan süreklilik yasasının 
kapsamının bir analizi ve onun bu (RPI) yapısının üzerine yerleştirilmesi. Üçüncü 
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olarak ise bu (RPI) continuum’unda dinamiğin ve gücün tam olarak yerinin 
belirlenmesi. 
Eğer bu üç perspektif (sınıflayıcı, kural koyucu, ve birleştirici) bir araya getirilirse 
monadların rolünün yeni bir kavrayışına yol açar; ve monadlar artık sadece 
Leibnizci felsefenin sağduyulu parçaları olarak değil (ideal uzay ve zamana karşı 
olarak), fakat hem bitişikliği hem de sürekliliği kendi içine katan dinamik bir 
continuum olarak ele alınacaktır. Ve böylesi bir yolla onlar, syncategorematic 
fenomenal sonsuzluğu hem etkisizleştirecek hem de muhafaza edecektir. Temel 
husus, gücün, monadların algılarına ve iştihalarına uygulanabilir olmasıdır, ve 
bununla biz, Zenon’un Dikotomi paradoksuna Leibnizci cevabın en kısasını 
vermiş oluyoruz: “Güç”. Fakat daha da önemli olan şey, böylesi dinamik bir 
yorumun, olgun Leibnizci felsefenin iyi şematik ve sistematik bir görünüşünü 
vermesidir. Ve görünüyor ki (beklenildiği gibi), Continuum Labirentinden çıkış 
yolu sadece geometrik ve fiziksel değil, fakat aynı zamanda metafizikseldir. 
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This paper is based on the recent scholarship and almost facet analysis by 
Richard Arthur, Glen Hartz, Jan Cover, Samuel Levey, Timothy Crockett, and François 
Duchesneau on Leibnizian continuum and philosophy. What I will try to do is a 
selective conceptual summary, also some corrections, and of course one further step – 
which I think changes the final perspective – a dynamical interpretation of the 
continuum. This whole analysis is actually based on a threefold perspective. Here are 
my main departing points: 
First, we have to differentiate all the realms of Leibnizian Weltanschauung. 
Second we have to trace what exactly is the scope of the Law of Continuity famously 
formulated by Leibniz in 1704. And at the end we have to see what the precise place of 
dynamics in such continuum is. 
But because all these perspectives (taxonomical, legislative and junctional) are 
interconnected within his philosophy (though changing until his mature thought), that’s 
why my exposition will be rather systematical than chronological. On the other hand I 
will try to make my idea as clear as possible and I will artificially divide the paper in 
three sections; but keep in mind that systematicity of Leibniz’s philosophy is the 
structural basis of my reading and the threefold paper division is propound only because 
it is more economical and neat. 
 
I. Weltanschauung – the three Leibnizian realms 
As the old interpretation on Leibniz has put it “[he] splits the realm of the actual 
into two domains: the realm of monads, the real world, which forms the object of study 
of metaphysics; and the realm of the things of our everyday experience, the phenomenal 
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world, which forms the object of study of the sciences in general, but pre-eminently of 
physics.” [italics added]1. So we have the standard Rescher split: Monads [the real 
world presented by metaphysics] and Things [the phenomenal world presented by 
sciences]; which, I think, still governs modern interpretations but in a more subtle form. 
But contemporary and recent scholarship is much more precise in its terminology 
and analysis of Leibniz’s texts and thoughts. So we can advance one further division 
which separates Leibnizian Weltanschauung in three. In this paper I will try to show 
that the continuum problem is another crucial differentiation mark between these realms 
of the world: (1) monads; (2) things; (3) space and time. The full argument for 
separating them can be found in the detailed research by Hartz and Cover2 – I will recall 
just 3 points from their conclusion: 
(R) Monads have full and non-derivative reality (R). 
(P) Only body – not every non-fundamental entity – is to be grounded on 
monads; and to be grounded means that you are not real as monads but phenomenal (P). 
(I) Space and time are abstract entities (derived directly from phenomenal world 
and accessible by thought) and being abstract is a feature of ideal (I) things. 
This (R)-(P)-(I) structure is hierarchical in such a way that every state is 
grounded on its left-standing realm. The analysis of Hartz and Cover covers mainly the 
connection between the phenomenal and ideal world, the monads are left out of the 
dynamical picture although they are important structural part in their paper too3. 
So we have 3 different realms – (R) substantial, (P) quasi-substantial and (I) res 
mentalis4. Hartz and Cover interpretation is really strong and profound, but because the 
task they had defined was limited they didn’t present a full analysis on the scope of the 
continuity, although it was central issue for the differentiation between (P) and (I). 
What I would like to do here is to map the Law of Continuity on this structure5 – this 
will make the distinction clearer but will bring further questions. 
                                                          
1 Nicholas Rescher, Leibniz: An Introduction to His Philosophy (Totowa: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1979) 65. 
2 Glenn A. Hartz and J. A. Cover, "Space and Time in the Leibnizian Metaphysic," Noûs 22, 
no. 4 (1988). 
3  Their concentration on P-I connection and differentiation is inevitable and logical – clarifying 
this relation is paper’s main message and contribution. But Hartz and Cover wrote: “We 
believe it is possible to complete a ‘reduction’ of space and time to monads; doing so requires 
the use of purely Leibnizian materials to show how ideal space and time are related, via the 
intermediate level of phenomenal bodies, to features of monads. But that is a separate 
project.” Well, partially I want to add several steps to this separate and more complete 
reading. 
4  Hartz and Cover, "Space and Time in the Leibnizian Metaphysic," 503-04. 
5  Timothy Crockett noticed that Leibniz is applying the Law of Continuity on these three 
levels, but still maintained that there are “two notions of continuity” following the twofold 
actual-ideal division – Timothy Crockett, "Continuity in Leibniz's Mature Metaphysics," 
Philosophical Studies 94, no. 1-2 (1999): 119-20. Compare his interpretation with Levey’s 
historical analysis on the two types of continuity: “potentiality” and “connectedness” – 
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II. Law of Continuity in (P)-realm and (I)-realm 
We have three different realms; but what is the implication of the legislative part 
of Leibnizian philosophy on them? I mean – what is the scope of the famous Law of 
Continuity on those realms and how does it work in ideal, phenomenal and real world? 
And if it is universal and covers everything is it one and the same law actually or it is 
limited and does have exceptions? 
Let me start with the law itself, formulated in New Essays on the Human 
Understanding (1704); Leibniz states that there are nowhere leaps: “Nothing takes place 
suddenly, and it is one of my great and best confirmed axioms that nature never makes 
leaps [la nature ne fait jamais des sauts]. I call this the Law of Continuity” 6.  
So instead of stages we have continuous degrees; this is a straightforward and 
clear statement but the problem is that on the other hand we have exactly the opposite 
statements by the same Leibniz: “Matter is not continuous but discrete, and actually 
infinitely divided” (to De Volder, 11 Oct, 1705)7; “In actuals there is only discrete 
quantity” (to De Volder, 19 Jan, 1706)8. More than 10 years earlier Leibniz wrote to 
Foucher: “Thus I believe that there is no part of matter which is not, I do not say 
divisible, but actually divided; and that consequently the least particle ought to be 
considered as a world full of an infinity of different creatures”9 and he said to Sophia 
that matter only appears to us to be continuum, just as does actual motion10; this is 
because matter is a discrete quantity and “the mass of bodies is actually divided in a 
determinate manner, and nothing in it is precisely continuous”11 and things move from 
one state to the next closest state12 and so on, and so on and even more... 
Reading such contradictory passages Russell made his witty remark: “In spite of 
the law of continuity, Leibniz’s philosophy may be described as a complete denial of 
the continuous”13. In a forthcoming paper Richard Arthur is showing that if you 
introduce the idea of syncategorematic infinity incompatibility between these various 
                                                                                                                                              
Samuel Levey, "Matter and Two Concepts of Continuity in Leibniz," Philosophical Studies 
94, no. 1-2 (1999). 
6  Gottfried Leibniz, "Die Philosophischen Schriften Von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz," in OLMS 
Paperbacks (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1965), V, 49. Even earlier (April 3rd, 1699) he 
had already written to De Volder that no transition occurs by a leap – “nullam transitionem 
fieri per saltum” Leibniz, "Gp," ІІ, 168. 
7 „Revera materia non continuum sed discretum est actu in infinitum divisum…“ Leibniz, 
"Gp," ІІ, 278. 
8 „In Actualibus non esse nissi dicretam Quantitatem…“ Ibid., ІІ, 282. 
9 “Ainsi je crois qu’il n’y a aucune partie de la nature qui ne soit, je ne dis pas divisible mais 
actuellement divisée, et par conséquent la moindre parcelle doit être considérée comme un 
monde plein d’une infinité de créatures différentes” Ibid., І, 416. 
10 “It is our imperfection and the shortcomings of our senses that make us conceive physical 
things as mathematical entities, in which there is indeterminacy” Ibid., VІІ, 563. 
11 Ibid., VII, 562. 
12 „d'un estat à l'autre prochain” Ibid., VІІ, 564. 
13 Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, with an Appendix of 
Leading Passages (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press/Macmillan, 1900) 
111. 
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statements is only apparent. So Arthur is exonerating Leibniz from Russell’s criticism 
and at the end of his analysis he says: “All naturally occurring transitions are continuous 
in that the difference between neighboring states is smaller than any assignable. This 
means not that there exists a least difference, but that for any assignable finite 
difference, there exists a smaller one. Thus there is a true continuous transition, even 
though the states themselves and all assignable differences between them are actually 
discrete.” [italics added]14. 
But still it sounds like a puzzle, like a labyrinth – what kind of solution is 
Arthur’s? Let me summarize everything in a few words to show more clearly the 
paradox: we have different statements in Leibniz which Russell claims that contradict 
each other and Arthur just puts them together – “continuous neighboring states” or 
“continuous transition of actually discrete states”15. Is this a real solution to Russell’s 
attacks? And what is this ‘syncategorematic’ here for? 
 
Categorematic vs. syncategorematic 
The idea about syncategorematic interpretation of Leibniz is brought maybe for 
the first time by Ishiguro16 in 70’s and it is getting more and more powerful. But if we 
want to understand her or Arthur’s defense and the validity of their interpretation we 
have to start from defining the notions of ‘categorematic infinity’ and ‘syncategorematic 
infinity’, i.e. Arthur’s: 
(C) categorematic – there exists some <y> which is greater than any finite 
number <x>; or there is a prime greater than every finite prime. 
(S) syncategorematic – for any finite number <x> there is a number <y> greater 
than it; or for every finite prime there is a greater prime17. 
As Arthur points out there many cases where a mistake can be done by assuming 
that categorematic and syncategorematic infinity are one and the same; in other words 
                                                          
14 Richard T. W. Arthur, "„A Complete Denial of the Continuous”? Leibniz's Law of 
Continuity," in Synthese (forthcoming), 33. 
15 We can trace the same issue in Crockett’s proposal that there are things structurally 
continuous (S-continuous) and discrete (non M-continuous) but there’s nothing discontinuous 
– Crockett, "Continuity in Leibniz's Mature Metaphysics," 132. Or even more literally 
paradoxical: discreteness of motion does not entail that motion is an aggregate of discrete 
states – Crockett, "Continuity in Leibniz's Mature Metaphysics," 133.  
16 The base for Arthur’s interpretation is the parallel which he makes between Leibniz’s 
contradictory remarks about continuity and identical contradictory remarks on the 
infinitesimals. Arthur cites Ishiguro because she already had showed that the solution about 
the later contradictions lies in differentiation between syncategorematic and categorematic 
infinity, so Arthur tries to make a parallel solution: “Just as an actual infinity of terms can be 
understood syncategorematically as more terms than can be assigned a number, without there 
being any infinite numbers, so too the infinitely small can be given a syncategorematic 
interpretation by means of the Law of Continuity, without there existing any actual 
infinitesimals” – Arthur, "„A Complete Denial of the Continuous”? Leibniz's Law of 
Continuity," 33. 
17 Ibid., 7-8. 
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it’s a fallacy to say that (C) “there is a prime greater than every finite prime” = (S) “for 
every finite prime there is a greater prime”. And the fallacy is quantifier shift fallacy18. 
The point is almost clear, but I want to make a small correction and to offer a 
visual metaphor: because in (S) we have Archimedean axiom (as Leibniz knew), so we 
don’t have biggest or smallest number and as a result the infinity is not number at all, 
that’s why we can picture this by “ellipsis”: […]. And (C) is not that we have greater 
number, as Arthur formulated it, but we have greatest, so we can picture it as “full stop” 
[.] – and it is now getting clear why (S) can be treated as infinity and why (C) is not so 
suitable for Leibniz... Of course I have to be more precise in this case and write “not so 
suitable for Leibniz after 1676”; because before 1676 he made several attempts to grasp 
the continuum through categorematic infinity, using indivisible points, unassignable 
gaps, infinitesimal lines… The difference between (C) and (S) will be even clearer if we 
compare them in a simple scheme. 
 
Early categorematic solutions 
In another very interesting forthcoming paper19 Arthur traces the elusive 
development of Leibniz’s early thought on the status of the actually infinitely small in 
relation to the continuum. He distinguishes three different categorematic stages prior to 
167620. From conceptual point of view they can be regarded not only as stages (which 
are abandoned one by one by Leibniz) but also as different perspectives towards the 
continuum problem. I will only summarize them in a scheme, because they do not have 
direct connection with my dynamical interpretation: 
Leibniz’s categorematic solutions. Mainly based on Arthur’s paper 
Table 01 
Level A. Metaphysical B. Physical C. Mathematical 
Period Pre-1670 1670-71 1672-75 
Common 
ground 
Francisco Arriaga, 
Kalam; 
Hobbes Sextus Empiricus, Hobbes 
Main 
notions 
Void 
(quietulas; esse nihil) 
Parts (partes); 
Endeavor (conatus) 
Lines (linea); 
Endeavor (conatus) 
Arthur’s 
definition 
the continuum consists 
of assignable points 
separated by 
unassignable gaps; 
 
 
the continuum is composed 
of an infinity of indivisible 
points, or parts smaller 
than any assignable, with 
no gaps between them; 
 
a continuous line is composed 
of infinitely many infinitesimal 
lines, each of which is divisible 
and proportional to an element 
(conatus) of a generating 
motion at an instant; 
                                                          
18 It is a very original and clear difference, Ibid., 8. 
19 “From Actuals To Fictions: Four Phases in Leibniz’s Early Thought On Infinitesimals” will 
appear in Studia Leibnitiana. 
20 Another interesting analysis on Leibniz’s changing thought during these years is Levey, 
"Matter and Two Concepts of Continuity in Leibniz". 
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Explanation (1) Continuity of 
motion is interrupted 
by unassignable 
intervals of rest – times 
smaller than any given. 
 
(2) Bodies are 
continually (re)created. 
(1) Continuum is 
composed of infinitely 
small indivisibles, defined 
as parts which have 
magnitude, but no 
extension; 
 
(2) Continuity of motion is 
established through its 
composition out of conatus 
or endeavours 
 
(3) Leibniz attempts to 
distinguish minima (having 
zero magnitude) from 
indivisibles (having zero 
extension); 
(1) Continuum is composed of 
infinitely small extended 
indivisibles, defined as parts 
which have magnitude 
proportional to the conatus of 
the generating motion; 
Leibniz’s 
argument 
 Inverted version of Zeno’s 
Dichotomy argument 
Diagonal paradox by Sextus 
Empiricus 
Sources De rationibus motus 
(1669-70) 
Letter to Thomasius 
(April 30th, 1669) 
Theoria Motus Abstracti 
(1671) 
De minimo et maximo 
(1672-73) 
 
 
As we can see Leibniz made several attempts to solve the continuum puzzle 
within itself, looking for different types of compositional indivisibles. And finally he 
couldn’t find any categoremacity in this phenomenal world, which immediately made it 
“dependent on”. This is my first step towards the dynamical interpretation of the 
continuum. 
 
Final syncategorematic solution 
After 1676 Leibniz realized that the mathematics cannot provide categoremacity 
too (for any phenomenal realm), because there is no such thing as infinite number; and 
by number he meant something that can unite multiplicity. So here is the analogous 
scheme about the syncategorematic solution proposed by Leibniz. 
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Leibniz’s syncategorematic solution. Mainly based on Arthur’s paper 
Table 02 
Level A. Mathematical 
Period After 1676 
Common 
ground 
Archimedes 
Main notions Infinitesimals are fictions (fictionem) 
Arthur’s 
definition 
„infinitesimals are fictitious entities, which may be used as compendia loquendi to 
abbreviate mathematical reasoning; they serve as a shorthand for the fact that finite 
variable quantities may be taken as small as desired, and so small that the resulting 
error falls within any preset margin of error”  
Explanation (1) If infinitesimals are fictitious entities that mean that you cannot use the ideal 
mathematical realm as continuum unity. Infinitesimals are just abstractions which 
cannot unite physical aggregates. 
 
(2) Our phenomenal realm cannot be dependent on our ideal realm. 
Leibniz’s 
argument 
No infinite number or infinite whole 
Sources Pacidius Philalethi (1676) 
Numeri infiniti (1676) 
 
This was Leibniz’s final solution about geometrization of the continuum. That 
means – mathematics cannot provide the needed independence (categorematicity) for 
our phenomenal realm. This will lead us closer to his final systematical (neither purely 
idealist, nor materialist) account. But let me go ahead and deep in this syncategorematic 
solution. 
 
Syncategorematic continuum vs. Ideal continuum 
Quite often syncategorematic infinity is defined as potential and categorematic 
infinity as actual. Exactly here lies the important change and paradox which we are 
revealing in Leibniz, because he is talking about actual syncategorematic infinity. What 
does this concept mean? 
On one hand it is actual and for Leibniz that meant finite; because there is no 
such thing as infinite number (numbers are either even or odd – 1, 2, 3, 4…)21; but on 
the other hand it is syncategorematical, which means infinite (there is always more to 
count and there are everywhere middle terms). So what we have here is exactly what 
both Russell and Arthur noticed from different perspectives – we have strange mixture 
                                                          
21 “… infinity, that is to say the accumulation of an infinite number of substances, is, properly 
speaking, not a whole any more than infinite number itself, whereof one cannot say whether it 
is even or uneven.” Theodicy §195, Leibniz, "Gp," VІ, 232. 
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between actual division and infinity of the division. But do we have real continuum 
than? Russell will say no, Arthur, I think, will say yes. But I claim that Russell would be 
right though he didn’t understood Leibniz’s point and Arthur would be partially wrong 
though he got the path out of the labyrinth. Here is my explanation of this obscure 
answer: 
The phenomenal world is discrete and Leibniz said it many-many times – every 
interpretation starts and should start with this22. But on the other hand between every 
two things and states there are always more and more. Than he added that the margin of 
error between “continuous” circle and infinitely-sided “discrete” body is almost null. 
But this is not ontology anymore; it is part of his epistemology and of course the error 
is null in exactly the same way as matter appears to be continuous. The discreetness is 
so dense that the error between continuous (circle) and non-continuous (body) is 
unassignable. We can check another interesting example: “we know that a given ellipse 
approaches a parabola as closely as desired, so that when the second focus of the ellipse 
is removed far enough away from the first focus, the difference between the ellipse and 
the parabola becomes less than any given difference, since then the radii from that 
distant focus differ from parallel lines by an amount as small as desired”23. So when 
Arthur and Leibniz talk about assignability they are only within the discourse of 
epistemology. But from ontological perspective there is discreetness to infinity in the 
matter – the more it is actually divided the less it is really continuous. The phenomenal 
world is dense contiguum and not real continuum – “Contiguous things are those 
between which there is no distance”24. We have only syncategorematicity (infinite 
actual density) which is different from the continuum of space and time where we don’t 
have any discreetness only the whole itself and the division in this ideal realm would be 
derivative and possible: “But space and time taken together constitute the order of 
possibilities of the one entire universe, so that these orders – space and time – relate not 
only to what actually is but also to anything that could be put in its place, just as 
numbers are indifferent to the things which can be enumerated”25. 
So, I think we have to keep the difference between (P)-realm continuum and (I)-
realm continuum in order to understand further distinctions between the phenomenal 
                                                          
22 I am not convinced that we have to make such artificial differentiation as Crockett did: 
discreetness (different things) is not discontinuity (having gaps) – Crockett, "Continuity in 
Leibniz's Mature Metaphysics.". Especially if having such remarks by Leibniz: “in order to 
have a variety of boundaries arising in matter a discontinuity of the parts is necessary” [italics 
added] – Gottfried Leibniz, "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften Und Briefe," 
(Darmstadt/Leipzig: Otto Reichl Verlag, 1923-...), VІ-2, 435. And one comment from Levey: 
“[matter] is not continuous but discrete; its parts are strictly discontinuous” – Levey, "Matter 
and Two Concepts of Continuity in Leibniz," 83-84. 
23 Leibniz, "Ag," VІ-4, 2032. 
24 Ibid., VІ-3, 94; translation in – Gottfried Leibniz, The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings 
on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686, ed. Daniel Garber and Robert C. Sleigh, trans. 
Richard T. W. Arthur, The Yale Leibniz (Yale: Yale University Press, 2001) 19. 
25 Leibniz, "Gp," ІV, 568. 
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and ideal, between matter and space, between motion and time, between parts and the 
whole26… 
Let’s make a quick summary: the Law of Continuity works within phenomenal 
world in such a way that it manifests itself as syncategorematical where contiguous 
approaches continuum (and the differentiating error between them is null) but still there 
is a difference between this phenomenal world and the realm of abstract space and time. 
The difference is smaller than any assignable, says Leibniz, but from fundamental level 
we can state the difference with his own words: “In actual, single terms are prior to 
aggregates, in ideals the whole is prior to the part” (to Des Bosses, 31 July, 1709)27. Of 
course you cannot assign such a qualitative difference, but you can state it. So what we 
see are syncategorematically infinite aggregates, not wholes, and aggregates are 
fundamentally discrete (though actually infinitely divided and approaching continuity). 
Such an unassignable error is quite close to Leibniz’s identity of indiscernibles. We can 
use now this famous principle as a test-question: is it one and the same case to have a 
syncategorematically-sided body and continuous circle? If we talk about quantity – yes. 
But if we talk about quality – no. One thing can approach the other only if we keep this 
difference; and only than abstract mathematics can measure our phenomenal world. 
And when we think about fundamentals is not about usability and errors, but it is about 
priority: „Matter is not continuous but discrete, and actually infinitely divided, though 
no assignable part of space is without matter. But space, like time, is something not 
substantial, but ideal, and consists in possibilities, or in an order of coexistents that is in 
some way possible. And thus there are no divisions in it but such as are made by the 
mind, and the part is posterior to the whole. In real things, on the contrary, units are 
prior to the multitude and multitudes exist only through units” [italics added]28. 
Than why dealing so much with phenomenal if we have an ideal realm? Because 
extension is prior to space, as duration is prior to time. Space and time derive from 
phenomenal world and the (P)-realm is the foundation of the (I)-realm. It seems that 
syncategorematic continuum (parts prior the whole) is the foundation of abstract 
continuum (whole prior the parts)29. How is it possible? 
 
Syncategorematic infinity – a well-founded phenomenon 
Before going to junctional part of this paper let me be clear on one more point – 
the division (or cut) does not produce this phenomenal world; the division is only a 
                                                          
26 Jus remember that space and time are “are perfectly uniform and arbitrarily divisible” [italics 
added] – Hartz and Cover, "Space and Time in the Leibnizian Metaphysic," 499. 
27 “In actualibus simplicia sunt anteriora aggregatis, in idealibus totum est prius parte” – 
Leibniz, "Gp," ІІ, 379. 
28 ”Revera materia non continuum sed discretum est actu in infinitum divisum, etsi nulla pars 
spatii assignabilis materia vacet. At spatium, ut tempus, non substantiale est quiddam, sed 
ideale, et in possibilitatibus seu ordine coexistentium utcunque possibili consistit. Itaque 
nullae ibi divisiones nisi quas mens facit, et pars toto posterior est. Contra in realibus unitates 
multitudine sunt priores, nec existunt multitudines nisi per unitates“ – Ibid., ІІ, 278-79. 
29 If we put it this way it is clear that something is missing – both in epistemological and in 
ontological domain. And what is missing is the real world, the (R)-realm. 
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manifestation of its infinity and a differentiation between the first and second matter. 
But what makes or produces the phenomenal realm is the connection of its infinite parts, 
which put together make aggregates. So if left alone the syncategorematic infinity 
would lead to dissociation. And here we can see once more the difference between the 
(I)-realm and (P)-realm. In the abstract realm there is no dissociation, because we have 
the whole as its basis and the division (or the cut) just discloses its a priori continuity. 
Leibniz even wrote that in ideal realm “the notion of the whole is simpler than that of 
fractions, and precedes it” [italics added]30. But for phenomenal realm we need 
something else which will neutralize and preserve its syncategorematic infinite division 
– it cannot be (an abstract) space, because Leibniz is relationist and do not use space 
and time as substratum. Concerning this frenetic division (that I claim would lead to 
dissociation) Leibniz wrote to Foucher (1693): “Thus I believe that there is no part of 
matter which is not, I do not say divisible, but actually divided; and that consequently 
the least particle ought to be considered as a world full of infinity of different 
creatures”31. This thought is already conceptualized in Theory of concrete motion 
(1670-1671) where he famously stated that every atom will be of infinite species 
[quaelibet atomus erit infinitarum specierum] and there are worlds within worlds to 
infinity [mundi in mundis in infinitum]32 and within every fold in the fold there is 
another endlessly folded world. What makes this split (approaching continuum) 
tenable? How it doesn’t fall apart – I mean both the phenomenal world and Leibniz’s 
conception? 
Or we can state it as Stuart Brown: “[the problem is] how anything that is 
extended in space or time can be real if each of its parts is further divisible ad 
infinitum”33. If we are looking for reality we have to switch the realm. So its time to 
analyze the real world, because if we want to make consistent continuum theory we 
have to apply the Law of Continuity to all the realms of the Leibnizian Weltanschauung. 
 
III. Dynamics – the (R)-realm 
Up to now we left (R)-world somehow out of the picture. So what are the 
characteristics of this realm? Immediate, short answer: these are the characteristics of 
the monads themselves34. 
                                                          
30 Letter to Electress Sophie (31 Oct, 1705) – Leibniz, "Gp," VІІ, 562. 
31 Ainsi je crois qu'il n'y a aucune partie de la matiere qui ne soit, je ne dis pas divisible, mais 
actuellement divisée, et par consequent, la moindre particelle doit estre considerée comme un 
monde plein d'une infinité de creatures differentes – Ibid., І, 416. Or: “There is an infinity of 
creatures in the smallest particle of matter, because of the actual division of the continuum to 
infinity.” Theodicy §195, Leibniz, "Gp," VІ, 232. 
32 Leibniz, "Gp," ІV, 210. The influence by Robert Hook’s Micrographia is obvious. 
33 Stuart Brown, "The Seventeenth-Century Intellectual Background," in The Cambridge 
Companion to Leibniz, ed. Nicholas Jolley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
51. 
34 As Garber showed there are at least two metaphysical strains in Leibniz ontology. I will stick 
to the more popular one up to now, the monadological – Daniel Garber, "Leibniz: Physics and 
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Monads – step out of the Labyrinth, step into the Continuum 
As Arthur have stated: “In this wider sense, the continuum problem is: what (if 
any) are the first elements of things and their motions?”35 So let me go through these 
first elements and Leibniz’s Monadology. Because it is a well-known territory I will 
make just a very brief summary of the most important parts for the continuum problem. 
1. Monads36 are simple substances and they are entering compounds (#1) [qu'une 
substance simple, qui entre dans les composés] and because they are simple they have 
no parts, neither extension nor form nor shape nor divisibility (#3). So what we have 
here is not only a definition of a monad but these are the basic characteristics of the 
principle of the continuum. 
On the other hand monads are well-determined and different (qualitatively 
discrete) from each other (#8-9) which is the principle of discontinuity. 
So we have already two sides of the monad themselves – indivisibility and 
discreetness. This differentiates them both from (P) and (I) realms. 
2. Further on (#10) Leibniz writes that every created being, and consequently the 
created monad, is subject to change, and further that this change is continuous in each 
[et même que ce changement est continuel dans chacune]. And the source of this 
continuity is monad’s internal principle [d'un principe interne] (#11) which he will call 
“l’appetit” (#15). This is the first side of the continuum. 
And the second is “la perception” (#14) which involve and represents a 
multiplicity in the unit (#13) – which is exactly what we were looking for in 
syncategorematic continuum. 
And again we have two sides – we have the principle of continuous change and 
we have the principle of multiplicity in unity37. Both sides work together, because 
Leibniz realized that every natural change takes place gradually, something changes and 
something remains unchanged (#13) – that’s the real secret of continuity. 
The appetition is the principle of change from one perception (multiplicity in 
unity) to another (multiplicity in unity) (#15). So we have the variety of all particular 
changes existing only eminently (#38) (as a source) in the primary unity [l'unité 
primitive] (#47). And in this original simple substance [la substance simple originaire] 
there is a continuous force (#48)38… 
                                                                                                                                              
Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, ed. Nicholas Jolley (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 293-98. 
35 Richard T. W. Arthur, "Cohesion, Division and Harmony: Physical Aspects of Leibniz's 
Continuum Problem (1671-1686)," Perspectives on Science 6, no. 1-2 [Leibniz and the 
Sciences] (1998): 110. 
36 I will use mainly Jonathan Bennett’s and Robert Latta’s translations. 
37 In this systematical interpretation appetition will produce in phenomenal realm all time-
relations and the perception will produce all spatial relations. So we can abstract them further 
in ideal realm as Time and Space. 
38 Leibniz concluded in Nature Itself (1698): “not only is everything that acts an individual 
substance, but also every individual substance acts continuously…”, translation by Jonathan 
Bennett, Early Modern Texts (2004 [cited 29 Feb 2008]); available from 
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At the end we can say that the monad is foundation of the syncategorematic 
continuum in its reality and principle. It neutralizes it, being simple continuum 
(monad); and preserves it, being more than one (monads). Monad vs. monads, or better 
to say monad and monads. It is the only way phenomenal infinity can be sustained. And 
so the Law of Continuity. 
The science of dynamics 
So it seems that the force is somehow very important for this interpretation – it 
unites and makes things dynamically continuous. There are many articles and analysis 
on the notion of Leibniz’s force, so I will not make even a summary here, but I will pick 
up just some very basic and important facts about the formation of the concept39. Of 
course I will not talk about force only in a strict physical sense40, but nothing in my 
thesis violates recent scholarship conclusions on Leibniz’s scientific thought. 
A. In De usu Geometriae (1676) he wrote: “Only Geometry can provide a thread 
for the Labyrinth of the Composition of the Continuum, of maximum and minimum, 
and the unassignable and the infinite, and no one will arrive at a truly solid metaphysics 
who has not passed through that labyrinth.”41. It is true that formulating the problem of 
continuum goes through analysis of infinity but the solution of the mature Leibniz is not 
only within the domain of the geometry. He gave up explaining everything with size, 
shape and motion (where geometry is quite strong) and decided to introduce the notion 
of force together with a whole new science – dynamics, which “treats force and the 
metaphysical entities”42. Furthermore in “Motion is not something absolute” (1686) he 
states: “And indeed each substance is a kind of force of acting, or an endeavor to 
                                                                                                                                              
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com. After 7 years he wrote to Electress Sophie (31 Oct, 1705) 
about “entelechies or primitive forces […] are the source of everything” – Leibniz, "Gp," VІІ, 
565, translation by Lloyd Strickland, Leibniz Translations (Feb 2008 [cited 29 Feb 2008]); 
available from http://www.leibniz-translations.com. And finally in Principles of Nature and 
Grace, Based on Reason (1714) he said: “a substance is a being that is capable of action”, 
translation by Bennett, Early Modern Texts. 
39 Leibniz’s development of this notion is a slow and many-faced. Very good introduction – 
where interactions between mechanics, scholasticism and dynamics are differentiated – is 
Garber, "Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy.". For a different short analysis of force’s historical 
development, see François Duchesneau, "Leibniz's Theoretical Shift in the Phoranomus and 
Dynamica De Potentia," Perspectives on Science 6, no. 1-2 (1998). 
40 Force is highly technical term which governs various laws, as Duchesneau writes: “Force is 
presented as a theoretical concept exceeding the intelligibility of geometrical concepts. And 
this new concept is presumed to own considerable regulative power for unifying the various 
empirical laws” Duchesneau, "Leibniz's Theoretical Shift in the Phoranomus and Dynamica 
De Potentia," 81. But on the other hand it is a pure metaphysical notion and as such it can be 
interpreted as a form, as did Leibniz. 
41 Leibniz, The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686 
xxiii. 
42 Garber, "Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy," 284. For example in “Discourse on Metaphysics” 
(1686), §18 he says: “Now, this force is something different from size, shape, and motion, and 
this shows us that - contrary to what our moderns have talked themselves into believing - not 
everything that we can conceive in bodies is a matter of extension and its modifications”, 
translation by Bennett, Early Modern Texts. 
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change itself with respect to all the others according to certain laws of its own nature” 
[italics added]43, so we have to introduce a science which will combine forces, 
substantial forms and their measurement. I think that there is a connection between 
abandoning the early categorematic conceptions of the continuum (before 1676) and 
abandoning geometry as the only key solution for the labyrinth of the continuum. 
B. In Lettre sur la question, si l’essence du corps consiste dans l’etendue (18 
June, 1691) published by Leibniz in the Journal des Savant he says: “All of this shows 
that there is in matter something else than the purely Geometrical, that is, than just 
extension and bare change. And in considering the matter closely, we perceive that we 
must add to them some higher or metaphysical notion, namely, that of substance, action 
and force; and these notions imply that anything which is acted on must act 
reciprocally, and anything which acts must receive some reaction; consequently, a body 
at rest should not be carried off by another body in motion without changing something 
of the direction and speed of the acting body” [added italics]44. Here we can see not 
only the notion of force to be introduced but already the differentiation of the forces 
themselves – active (act on) and passive (act reciprocally). We can say that the drive – 
active force – is analogous to monad’s appetite (that which is principle of change) and 
resistance – passive force – is analogous to monad’s perception (that which unites 
multiplicity)45. 
C. And 3 years later in his article On the Correction of Metaphysics and the 
Concept of Substance (published in Acta Eruditorum, March 1694) Leibniz mentions 
for the first time in print the notion dynamica as a new science on force: “…the concept 
of forces or powers, (which the Germans call Kraft and the French la force), and for 
whose explanation I have set up a distinct science of dynamics, brings the strongest light 
to bear upon our understanding of the true concept of substance”46. 
D. Finally in 1695 was published Specimen Dynamicum (in Acta Eruditorum) – 
which presented the metaphysical foundations of the dynamics and the foundations of 
posthumously published Dynamica de potentia et legibus naturae corporae. In 
                                                          
43 Leibniz, "Ag," VІ-4, 1638; translation from Leibniz, The Labyrinth of the Continuum: 
Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686 333. 
44 Or we can see another definition of dynamics: “I judged that it was worth the trouble to 
muster the force of my reasonings through demonstrations of the greatest evidence, so that, 
little by little, I might lay the foundations for the true elements of the new science of power 
and action, which one might call dynamics.” – Duchesneau, "Leibniz's Theoretical Shift in 
the Phoranomus and Dynamica De Potentia," 84. 
45 Interpretation on letter to De Volder – Leibniz, "Gp," ІІ, 170. It can be compared with this 
excerpt from “Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason” (1714): “The qualities of a 
monad must be its perceptions; a perception is a representation in something simple of 
something else that is composite. And a monad’s actions must be its appetitions, which are its 
tendencies to go from being in one state to being in another, i.e. to move from one perception 
to another; these tendencies are the sources of all the changes it undergoes” [italics added] – 
Bennett, Early Modern Texts. 
46 “…notionem virium seu virtutis (quam Germani vocant Krafft Galli la force) cui ego 
explicandæ peculiarem Dynamices scientiam destinavi, plurimum lucis afferre ad veram 
notionem substantiæ intelligendam” “De primæ philosophiæ emendatione et notione 
substantiæ” – Leibniz, "Gp," ІV-469.  
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Specimen Dynamicum Leibniz presented systematic study on primitive force and its 
relation to the substantial forms; its priority to extension and that it is a definition of 
‘substance’ (#2), its division of active, passive, primitive, derivative (#6-7), dead, live 
(#12), total, partial (#13) their measurement (#30) and so on... Further more he stated 
there: “In conformity with the Law of Continuity, which rules out jumps, rest can be 
considered as a special case of motion - that is, as vanishingly small or minimal motion 
- and equality can be considered as a case of vanishingly small inequality” 47. Motion is 
the effect of force – so there is continuity in effects because there is continuity in the 
force itself. Effects are part of the phenomenal realm (P) and primitive forces are 
constituents of the real realm (R). 
One more remark; it is well known that Leibniz incorporated Hobbesian conatus 
(endeavour) in his terminology48 and embraced dynamics as after-Cartesian solution to 
some Cartesian problems (as conservation of quantity of motion). So we can schematize 
the appearance of force as: there is no mechanical solution to the continuum problem, 
so we need a dynamical one. 
 
(R)-(P)-(I) and the Law of Continuity  
Let me make one final stroke by interconnecting the three realms: space and time 
are abstractions from the phenomenal world. But what has this phenomenal world in 
itself that can be abstracted in a form of continuum in the ideal realm? It has monadic 
substratum, it has substratic unities, so from phenomenal realm we abstract its real 
characteristics to make an ideal realm. In a letter to Arnauld (April 30th 1687) Leibniz 
postulated one crucial axiomatic statement which is “[an] identical proposition which 
varies only in emphasis: that what is not truly one entity is not truly one entity either”49. 
Oneness (unity) is our final step and it is clear why Leibniz decided to use exactly the 
word “monad” as a constituent of the (R)-realm. 
Let me make an overall summary of the continuum in his Weltanschauung. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 Translation by Bennett, Early Modern Texts. 
48 For more details, see Howard Bernstein, "Conatus, Hobbes, and the Young Leibniz," Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Science 11, no. 1 (1980) and Alan Gabbey, "Force and Inertia in 
Seventeenth-Century Dynamics," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 2, no. 1 
(1971). 
49 Gottfried Leibniz and Arnauld, The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence, ed. R. C. Sleigh, Jr, 
trans. H. T. Mason, The Philosophy of Leibniz - Fourteen of the Most Important Books on 
Leibniz's Philosophy Reprinted in Fifteen Volumes (New York/London: Garland Publishing, 
1985) 121. “… ce qui n'est pas véritablement un estre, n'est pas nan plus véritablement un 
estre.” – Leibniz, "Gp," ІІ, 97. 
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Realm 
(R) 
Real 
(P) 
Phenomenal 
(I) 
Ideal 
Knowledge Metaphysical Physical Mathematical 
Constituents Monads Bodies/Aggregates Figures50 
Characteristics51 Perception and Appetite Matter and Motion Space and Time 
Type of continuity Dynamical Syncategorematical Pure abstract 
Law of continuity There is a force. 
There’s always a 
middle term52. 
There’s a whole. 
Features 
Unity of contiguity 
(uniqueness) and 
continuity (change). 
Contiguity to infinity 
(dense)53. 
Continuity to infinity. 
Number of 
boundaries between 
things 
2 – (monads are different); 
0 – (monad is 
undividable) 54 
2 – each thing has its 
own boundary55. 
0 – interiorly 
unbounded. 
Domain 
Sufficient reason 
(unity of actual and 
possible). 
Actual. Possible. 
Priority Monad is prior to both part and the whole. 
Part is prior to the 
whole. 
Whole is prior to the 
part. 
Simplest One is simpler. Part is simpler. Whole is simpler. 
Infinity: Compendia 
loquendi 
 
Mirror 
 
Fold 
 
Infinitesimal 
[Visual metaphor] [.] […] [O] 
Key One Part Whole 
 
Now we can demonstrate the unity of the Law of Continuity. It seems that we 
have three different types of continuum (R)-(P)-(I), but actually it is only one: real, 
                                                          
50 Figures, but maybe not numbers; see Crockett, "Continuity in Leibniz's Mature Metaphysics," 
134. and compare it with Levey, "Matter and Two Concepts of Continuity in Leibniz," 87. 
51 These can be regrouped in two analogous chains: Perception-Matter-Space and Appetite-
Motion-Time. For example in Nature Itself (1698), §11 Leibniz locates the notion of primary 
matter in passive force – Bennett, Early Modern Texts. 
52 When formulated, Leibniz’s Law of Continuity was explained as: there is always something 
in between during any change from small to large (or vice versa). 
53 This is Crockett’s “structural continuity” – Crockett, "Continuity in Leibniz's Mature 
Metaphysics," 128. But, of course (though it resembles the ideal realm), there is no parallel to 
his “metaphysical continuity” because it is based on density which doesn’t make sense 
applied to figures and numbers – Crockett, "Continuity in Leibniz's Mature Metaphysics," 
130. 
54 We cannot talk about real boundaries in the (R)-realm. 
55 “For by the very fact that the parts are discontinuous, each will have its own separate 
boundaries [terminos]” – Leibniz, "Ag," VІ-2, 435. So the number of boundaries in the whole 
world will be always even. As Levey wrote: “discontinuous things, by contrast with 
continuous ones, are those whose boundaries are two.” – Levey, "Matter and Two Concepts 
of Continuity in Leibniz," 84. 
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phenomenal and ideal altogether – (RPI). It is a one whole with parts, multiplicity 
united by force. And I am not talking about the World itself, only about the law, (it 
would have been incorrect to state that the world has its own monad or soul)56. I am not 
claiming that there are no differences between the realms – exactly the opposite –
because there are differences the Law of Continuity is recursive and the engine of this 
recursion is the force. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
“In actual bodies there is only discrete quantity, that is, a multitude of monads or 
of simple substances, though in any sensible aggregate or one corresponding to 
phenomena, this may be greater than any given number. But a continuous quantity is 
something ideal which pertains to possible and to actualities only insofar as they are 
possible. A continuum, that is, involves indeterminate parts, while on the other hand, 
there is nothing indefinite in actual things, in which every division is made that can be 
made. Actual things are compounded as is number out of unities, ideal things as is a 
number out of fractions; the parts are actually in the real whole but not in the ideal 
whole. But we confuse ideal with real substances when we seek for actual parts in the 
order of possibilities, and indeterminate parts in the aggregate of actual things, and so 
entangle ourselves in the labyrinth of the continuum and in contradictions that cannot be 
explained. Meanwhile the knowledge of the continuous, that is, of possibilities, contains 
eternal truths which are never violated by actual phenomena, since the difference is 
always less than any given assignable amount.” [italics added]57. 
This is a really good resume by Leibniz. It is obvious he is talking only about 
two types of realm (actualities vs. possible), although he is much more precise when 
further differentiating real from phenomenal. By this citation we can assume that 
monadic level has the same type of syncategorematic structure as the matter itself, but 
what I wanted to show is that within the realm of monads next to their “discreetness” 
lies the principle of continuous change and the principle of oneness (simple substances) 
– what is not truly one entity is not truly one entity either. This is the difference between 
                                                          
56 In De mundo praeseti (1684-1686) Leibniz wrote: “The aggregate of all bodies is called the 
world, which, if it is infinite, is not even one entity, any more than an infinite straight line or 
the greatest number are. So God cannot be understood as the World Soul: not the soul of a 
finite world because God himself is infinite, and not of an infinite world because an infinite 
body cannot be understood as one entity [unum Ens], but that which is not one in itself [unum 
per se] has no substantial form, and therefore no soul.” – Leibniz, "Ag," VІ-4, 1509. More 
about this in Gregory Brown, "Leibniz’s Mathematical Argument against a Soul of the 
World," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13, no. 3 (2005). But this can be 
compared with his earlier thoughts in On the Secrets of the Sublime (1676): “[God] exist as a 
whole soul in the whole body of the world” – Leibniz, "Ag," VІ-3, 474; translation from 
Leibniz, The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686 
48. 
57 Leibniz in a letter to De Volder (19 Jan, 1706) – Brown, "Leibniz’s Mathematical Argument 
against a Soul of the World," 468; Leibniz, "Gp," ІІ, 282. My claim is stronger than what we 
see here in the last sentence. It’s not only about this epistemologically unassignable error, but 
it is because there is multiplicity in unity and unity of the multiplicity. 
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syncategorematical and dynamical continuum which I tried to present – introduction of 
the force. As Leibniz said “The cohesiveness of bodies is the quantity of force needed to 
destroy their contiguity” [italics added]58.  
The same force which keeps together the unity of the world is the force to grasp 
the multiplicity in unity (in our mind and in reality) and it is the force which sustains 
syncategorematic continuum by making it one. And the same force, abstracted, can 
produce the ideal Space (by monads’ perception) and ideal Time (by monads’ 
appetite)59; and in the opposite direction to reduce them via phenomenal world to the 
monads themselves. And the same force makes this world dynamical and thinkable. So 
the solution of the continuum problem cannot be plainly mathematical (ideal), and it 
cannot be plainly physical (phenomenal), but it can be both… and united by one (real) 
metaphysical principle. And even the historical period – Baroque – is always 
syncategorematically folded, as Deleuze said: “the characteristic of the Baroque is the 
fold that goes on to infinity”60. But if the fold should be one it needs a deeper dynamical 
level. So in Leibnizian world each doubling in itself is dynamical, syncategorematical 
and geometrically ideal. 
We can make another (this time epistemological) parallel; Leibniz wrote in 
Contingency (1686) that every analysis of a contingent proposition continues to infinity 
– you have a cause for the cause for the cause for the cause… so you will never have a 
complete demonstration. But on the other hand there is always an underlying complete 
and final reason for the truth of the proposition (only God completely grasps it, as being 
the only one who can whip through the infinite series in one stroke of the mind)61. And 
so contingent cause is contiguously continuous and sufficient reason is dynamically 
continuous. 
So at the end we should have only one Law of Continuity which corresponds to 
the three different realm structures. Which means that continuity will have 3 different 
structural manifestations but the law is one and the same – so even here we have 
multiplicity in one unity? The Law itself is meaningful only applied in (RPI) together 
and this is a subtle hint against the recent scholarship debate about “Was Leibniz an 
                                                          
58 Leibniz, "Ag," VІ-3, 94; translation from Leibniz, The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings 
on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686 19. Sometimes the influence of Descartes is still 
visible when Leibniz is talking not about force, but about motion as in On the Secrets of the 
Sublime (1676), but the idea is similar: “Matter is a discrete being [ens discretum], not a 
continuous one; it is only contiguous, and is united by motion or by a mind of some sort.” 
[italics added] – Leibniz, "Ag," VІ-3, 474; translation from Leibniz, The Labyrinth of the 
Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686 47. 
59 Compare this with the hint given by Garber: “extension, is properly speaking, a direct 
consequence of the properties bodies have by virtue of which they resist penetration by other 
bodies” – Garber, "Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy," 291. But than Garber is puzzled by the 
diagram from 1715 in the letter to De Bosses where primitive forces are only in this part of 
the (R)-realm which is substantia composita – Leibniz, "Gp," ІІ, 506. And I am not sure why 
Garber expects them “on the other side of the chart, in the characterization of 
semisubstances”… – Garber, "Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy," 298. 
60 Gilles Deleuze, "The Fold," Yale French Studies 80 (Baroque Topographies: 
Literature/History/Philosophy) (1991): 227. 
61 Bennett, Early Modern Texts. 
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idealist?”, because what is most important in Leibniz dynamics about continuity… is 
the reciprocity (RPI) of force, the reciprocity (RPI) of unity-multiplicity pair which is a 
pair connected by force62.  
 
 Leibniz and Zeno – the last words 
Of course, we cannot deal with the continuum problem non-mentioning Zeno, 
though there was no time, nor space, nor motion to include him in this paper. Still I 
would like to add one short question and even shorter answer. I was thinking can we 
illustrate the Leibniz solution to the continuum problem by re-reading for example 
Dichotomy as a dialogue and giving it a possible Leibnizian answer. 
Zeno: – That which is in locomotion must arrive at the half-way stage (1/2) 
before it arrives at the goal (1). And than if you pick the half-way stage (1/2) as your 
new goal you must first arrive at its half-way stage (1/4). And so on, 1/8, 1/16, 1/32… 
to infinity. So how is it possible, dear Leibniz, to overcome that infinity? 
Leibniz: – By force, Zeno, by force… 
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